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Abstract
We examine evolutionary basis for risk aversion with respect to aggregate risk.
We study populations in which agents face choices between aggregate risk and
idiosyncratic risk. We show that the choices that maximize the long-run growth
rate are induced by a heterogeneous population in which the least and most
risk averse agents are indifferent between aggregate risk and obtaining its linear
and harmonic mean for sure, respectively. Moreover, an approximately optimal
behavior can be induced by a simple distribution according to which all agents
have constant relative risk aversion, and the coefficient of relative risk aversion is
uniformly distributed between zero and two.




Our understanding of risk attitudes can be sharpened by considering their evolutionary
basis in situations in which agents face choices that affect their number of offspring (see
Robson & Samuelson, 2011, for a survey). Various papers have shown that idiosyncratic
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risk (independent across individuals) induces a higher long-run growth rate (henceforth,
growth rate) than aggregate risk and as a result, natural selection should induce agents
to be more risk averse when facing aggregate risk.
This general result has been presented in three main forms in the literature. The first
representation highlights the fact that the optimal long-run growth rate can be achieved
by maximizing a logarithmic utility with respect to aggregate risk and a linear utility
with respect to idiosyncratic risk (see, e.g., Lewontin & Cohen, 1969; Robson, 1996).
The second representation shows that the optimal long-run growth rate can be achieved
by agents who maximize the expected relative fitness (namely, the ratio between the
agent’s number of offspring and the total number of offspring in her generation; see,
e.g., McNamara, 1995; Grafen, 1999; Curry, 2001; Orr, 2007). Finally, the bet-hedging
approach interprets this result as the population should achieve a trade-off between
maximizing the expected mean number of offspring and minimizing the variance of the
mean number of offspring in the population (see, e.g., Cohen, 1966; Cooper & Kaplan,
1982; Bergstrom, 1997).1
In this paper, we introduce a new representation of the above general result that
fits situations in which agents face discrete choices between alternatives with aggregate
risk (which we refer to as risky alternatives) and alternatives without aggregate (which
we refer to as safe alternatives). We show that the optimal growth rate is induced
by a heterogeneous population of utility-maximizers, in which agents have different
levels of risk aversion with respect to the aggregate risk. In this population, the most
risk averse agent is indifferent between obtaining a risky lottery y and obtaining the
harmonic mean of y for sure, while the least risk averse agent is risk neutral, that is,
indifferent between obtaining the risky lottery y and obtaining the arithmetic mean
of y for sure. Moreover, we show that a near-optimal growth rate can be achieved by
a simple distribution of vNM (von Neumann–Morgenstern) preferences, according to
which all agents have constant relative risk aversion, and the risk coefficient is uniformly
distributed between zero and two. This new representation circumvents some of the
difficulties we see in applying the existing representations to the prehistoric evolution
of risk preferences (as discussed in Section 5).
1See also Robson & Samuelson (2009) and Netzer (2009) who study the evolution of risk attitude
and its impact on time preferences, Robatto & Szentes (2017) who study choices that influences
fertility rate in continuous time, Robson & Samuelson (2019) who explore age-structured populations,
and Heller & Robson (2021) who analyze heritable risk, which is correlated between an agent and her
offspring. The approach has been applied to analyze the prevalence of overconfidence in Heller (2014)
and of the equity premium in Robson & Orr (2021).
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Highlights of the Model We consider a continuum population with asexual repro-
duction. Each agent lives a single generation, in which she faces a choice between two
lotteries over the number of offspring: a safe alternative for which the a-priori distribu-
tion of the number of offspring is known, and a risky alternative y with aggregate risk
(i.e., after the agents make their choices, y is instantiated to be one safe alternative out
of a given set). Nature induces the population with a distribution of risk preferences
with regard to aggregate risk, according to which each of the agents chooses between
the risky alternative and the safe alternative (and we assume that all agents are risk
neutral with regard to idiosyncratic risk).
Main Results If Nature were limited to endow all agents with the same preference,
then it would be optimal that all agents evaluate any risky alternative y as having a
certainty equivalent of its geometric mean. However, heterogeneous populations can
induce substantially higher growth rate, because heterogeneity in risk aversion allows
the population to hedge the aggregate risk by enabling scenarios in which only a portion
of the population (the less risk averse agents) chooses the risky alternative.
Proposition 1 characterizes the optimal share of agents that chooses the risky alter-
native. That is, the share that maximizes the long-run growth rate. In particular, it
shows that all agents should choose the safe option iff E [y] ⩽ µ and all agents should
choose the risky option iff the harmonic mean of y, HM (y), satisfies HM (y) ⩾ µ.
Moreover, we characterize the optimal preference distribution (Proposition 2): (1) The
least risk averse agent in the population is risk neutral, (2) the most risk averse agent
in the population has harmonic utility, i.e., she evaluates any risky alternative y as
having a certainty equivalent of its harmonic mean, and (3) all agents in the population
should be risk averse, but less risk averse than the harmonic utility.
The optimal distribution of preferences is quite complicated. By contrast, our nu-
meric analysis shows that a nearly-optimal growth rate can be achieved by a simple
distribution of vNM utilities with constant relative risk aversion, where the relative
risk coefficient is uniformly distributed between zero (risk neutrality) and two (har-
monic utility). The predictions of our model fit reasonably well with the empirical
works on the distribution of risk attitude in the population, as discussed in Section 5.
Structure The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model.
Section 3 presents the analytic results, which are supplemented by a numeric analysis
in Section 4. We conclude with a discussion in Section 5.
3
2 Model
Consider a continuum population with an initial mass one. Reproduction is asexual.
Time is discrete, indexed by t ∈ N. Each agent lives a single time period (which
is interpreted as a generation). In each time period, each agent in the population
faces a choice between two alternatives, where each alternative is a lottery over the
number of offspring. The first alternative has only idiosyncratic risk (henceforth, the
safe alternative) and its expected value is µ.
The second alternative bears aggregate risk (henceforth, the risky alternative). That
is, after the agents make their choices, y is instantiated to be a safe alternative out of
a given finite set (e.g., due to an environmental dependence among the lotteries taken
by the individuals in a given generation, where the environment for each generation is
an i.i.d. draw from a known distribution). Specifically, the mean number of offspring
of agents who choose the risky alternative is a random variable ỹ with a finite support.
Henceforth, we identify ỹ with y and denote its distribution by supp (y) = ¶y1, ..., yn♢ ∈
R+ and Pr [y = yi] = pi.
We justify our choice to model an alternative y as a distribution over the mean
number of offspring of agents who choose y on two grounds. First, due to an exact large
law of large numbers for continuum populations, the mean number of offspring of agents
who choose a safe alternative equals to its expectation, and hence the mean number of
offspring is a sufficient statistic for analyzing the long-run growth rate. Second, from
an agent’s perspective, this choice is equivalent to assuming risk neutrality with respect
to idiosyncratic risk, which is a plausible and common assumption (see, e.g., Robson,
1996). We further discuss this assumption in Section 5.
Let Y denote the set of risky alternatives (i.e., distributions over non-negative
numbers). A risky alternative y ∈ Y is non-degenerate if ♣supp (y)♣ > 1. We identify
a constant number of offspring µ with the degenerate distribution that yields µ with
probability 1.
Growth rate Let w (t) denote the size of the population in time t. Let grα (y, µ)
denote the long-run growth rate (henceforth, growth rate) of a population in which
in each generation a share of α of the population chooses the risky option y and the
remaining agents obtain the safe option µ. It is well-known (see, e.g., Robson, 1996)
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that the growth rate grα (y, µ) is equal to the geometric mean of αy + (1 − α) µ:





= GM (αy + (1 − α) µ) =
∏
i⩽n
(αyi + (1 − α) µ)
pi . (1)
The intuition for Equation (1) is as follows. Let z (t) = w(t+1)
w(t)
be the mean number of
offspring at generation t, i.e., z (t) is a sequence of i.i.d. variables which are distributed

































(αyi + (1 − α) µ)
pi ,
where the equality marked by (⋆) is implied by the law of large numbers.
Let α⋆ ∈ [0, 1] be the share of agents who choose the risky alternative that maximizes
the long-run growth rate (We show in Proposition 1 that α⋆ (y, µ) is unique.):
α⋆ (y, µ) = argmax
α∈[0,1]
(grα (y, µ)) . (2)
Preferences Each agent is endowed with a preference over the lotteries, i.e., a linear
order ≽ over the set Y (and we use the notation ∼ for indifference). That is, Agent a
chooses the risky alternative iff y ≻a µ (the tie-breaking rule when y ∼a µ has no impact
on our results since it holds for a share of measure zero of the population). A preference
≽ is regular if it satisfies the following two mild assumptions: (1) monotonicity over
the safe alternatives: µ < µ′ implies that µ ≺ µ′, and (2) any risky alternative has a
certainty equivalent: for any y ∈ Y , there exists a safe alternative µ such that y∼µ.
Let U denote the set of regular preferences. Observe that any regular preference ≽
can be represented by a certainty equivalent function CE≽ : Y → R+, which evaluates
each risky alternative in terms of the equivalent safe alternative (i.e., CE≽ (y) = µ iff
y ∼ µ).
We assume that Nature endows the population with a distribution Φ of regular
preferences, and that each agent uses her preference to choose an alternative. A distri-
bution of regular preferences Φ induces a choice function αΦ : Y × R+ → [0, 1], which
describes the share of agents who choose the risky option for any pair of alternatives.
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A distribution of regular preferences Φ⋆ is optimal if for any y ∈ Y and µ ∈ R+ it
maximizes the growth rate, i.e.,
αΦ⋆ (y, µ) = α
⋆ (y, µ) = argmax
α∈[0,1]
(grα (y, µ)) . (3)
Utility A common way to represent the preference of Agent a is using a utility func-
tion, Ua : Y → R+, s.t. Agent a strictly prefers an alternative y ∈ Y over another
alternative y′ ∈ Y iff Ua (y) > Ua (y
′). We note that for a given regular preference
≽, its certainty equivalent function CE≽ is in particular a utility function which repre-
sents ≽.
A preference ≽ is a vNM (von Neumann–Morgenstern) preference if it has an
expected utility representation, that is, if there exists a Bernoulli utility function
u : R+ → R such that ≽ is represented by the utility function E [u (y)] =
∑
i pi · u (yi)
for any y ∈ Y .
Risk aversion and Constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences A
preference ≽ is risk averse (resp., risk neutral) if CE≽ (y) < E [y] (resp., CE≽ (y) =
E [y]) for any non-degenerate risky alternative y ∈ Y . A preference ≽ is more risk
averse than a preference ≽′ if CE≽ (y) < CE≽′ (y) for any non-degenerate risky alter-
native y ∈ Y .
For any ρ ⩾ 0, let CRRAρ denote the constant relative risk aversion preference
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It is well-known that:
1. HM (y) ⩽ GM (y) ⩽ E [y] with a strict inequality whenever y is non-degenerate.
2. Under the utilities CRRA0, CRRA1, and CRRA2, the certainty equivalent val-
ues of any risky alternative y ∈ Y are its arithmetic, geometric, and harmonic
means, respectively. Hence, we also refer to CRRA0 as the linear utility, to
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CRRA1 as the logarithmic utility, and to CRRA2 as the harmonic utility.
Last, a distribution Φ of regular preferences is monotone if its support is a chain with
respect to the strong risk aversion order, i.e., for any two preferences ≽ and ≽′ in the
support of Φ, ≽ is either strictly more risk averse or strictly less risk averse than ≽′.
3 Results
Observe that if Nature is limited to a homogeneous population in which all agents
have the same risk preference, then the maximal long-run growth rate is attained by
the logarithmic utility CRRA1, according to which the certainty equivalent of a risky
alternative is its geometric mean (as was originally observed by Lewontin & Cohen,
1969). This is an immediate corollary of Equation 1 and the definition of CRRA
preferences.
Fact 1. For any y ∈ Y and µ ∈ R+, gr1 (y, µ) ⩾ gr0 (y, µ) ⇔ Û1 (y) ⩾ Û1 (µ).
Our analysis is motivated by the fact that heterogeneous populations in which agents
differ in their extent of risk aversion can induce substantially higher growth rate, because
the heterogeneity allows the population to hedge the aggregate risk by having only the
more risk averse agents choosing the risky alternative. For example, if agents face a
choice between a safe alternative yielding µ = 1 offspring to each agent or a risky
alternative y yielding either 4 offspring or 0.25 offspring with equal probabilities, then
any homogeneous population in which all agents share the same risk preference (with
a deterministic tie-breaking rule) yields a growth rate of 1 (because both gr0 (y, µ) =
µ = 1 and gr1 (y, µ) = GM (y) = 4
0.5 · 0.250.5 = 1). By contrast, a heterogeneous
population in which agents differ in their extent of risk aversion such that half the
population choose y and the others choose the safe alternative induces a substantially
higher growth rate of
gr0.5 (y, µ) = GM (0.5 · y + 0.5 · 1) = 2.5
0.5 · 0.6250.5 = 1.25.
Our first result characterizes the optimal share of agents that choose the risky al-
ternative.2
Proposition 1. Fix y ∈ Y and µ ∈ R+. Then:
2Similar results to Proposition 1 in related setups have been presented in the literature (see, e.g.,
the relative fitness condition in Brennan & Lo, 2012). For completeness we present a short proof.
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1. α⋆ (y, µ) = argmaxα∈[0,1] (grα (y, µ)) is unique.
2. α⋆ (y, µ) = 0 iff E [y] ⩽ µ, and
α⋆ (y, µ) = 1 iff HM (y) ⩾ µ.












 = 0. (5)
Proof. The long-run growth rate when a share α of the population chooses y is (See
Equation 1)
grα (y, µ) = GM (α · y + (1 − α) · µ) = e
E[ln(α·y+(1−α)·µ)].

























there is exactly one maximizer for grα (y, µ) in [0, 1], and the following three statements
hold.
• α⋆ (y, µ) = 0 iff d
dα
ln (grα (y, µ)) ♣α=0 = E [y/µ] − 1 ⩽ 0, i.e., E [y] ⩽ µ.
• α⋆ (y, µ) = 1 iff d
dα
ln (grα (y, µ)) ♣α=1 = 1 − E [µ/y] ⩾ 0, i.e., µ ⩽ HM (y).












Given a a distribution Φ of regular preferences and a risky alternative y ∈ Y , we
define Φy to be the distribution of certainty equivalent values of y in the population.
Our next result characterizes the optimal distribution of risk preferences. Specifically,
it shows that for any risky alternative y, the induced distribution Φy has a support that
starts in y’s harmonic mean and ends in y’s arithmetic mean, and fully characterizes
these induced distributions.
Proposition 2. Let Φ be a distribution of regular preferences. Then, Φ is optimal iff
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for any risky alternative y ∈ Y , the cumulative density function (CDF) of Φy is
CDFΦy (x) = 1 − α
⋆ (y, x) .
In particular, for any (non-degenerate) risky alternative y ∈ Y ,
• The support of Φy is [HM (y) ,E [y]].












Note that by Proposition 1, (1 − α⋆ (y, x)) is indeed a CDF for any (non-degenerate)
risky alternative y. α⋆ (y, x) equals one when x ⩽ HM (y), to zero when x ⩾ E [y], and





)−1 ∣∣∣∣ y ̸= x

= 0, otherwise. The function x 7→ α⋆ (y, x) is
continuous and strictly downward monotone in x ∈ (HM (y) ,E [y]) since the function





)−1 ∣∣∣∣ y ̸= x

is continuous, with a bounded domain, and strictly
downward monotone in x. I.e., 1 − α⋆ (y, x) equals zero for x ⩽ HM (y), equals one
for x ⩾ E [y], and is continuous and strictly upward monotone in between.
Proof. Let Φ be a distribution of regular preferences. An agent prefers y over a safe
alternative µ iff her certainty equivalent value of y is higher than µ, which holds for a
proportion 1 − CDFΦy (µ) of the population; i.e.,
αΦ (y, µ) = 1 − CDFΦy (µ) .
Hence, Φ is optimal iff for any y ∈ Y and µ ∈ R+,
αΦ (y, µ) = α
⋆ (y, µ) , i.e., CDFΦy (µ) = 1 − α
⋆ (y, µ) .
In particular, by Proposition 1, for any risky alternative y ∈ Y the support of Φy is
[HM (y) ,E [y]].
Moreover, for any λ ∈ (0, 1) the λ-median of Φy, mλ, satisfies
λ = CDFΦy (mλ) = 1 − α
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(y − λ (y − x))2
]
< 0,





)−1 ∣∣∣∣ y ̸= x

= 0.
Corollary 1. By Proposition 2, the following is the unique monotone optimal distribu-
tion of regular preferences Φ⋆. We index the agents by [0, 1] and define the preference
of Agent a ∈ [0, 1] by defining her certainty equivalent value for any risky alternative
y ∈ Y to be:
• HM (y) if a = 0,
• E [y] if a = 1, and











 = 0, otherwise.
We note that the behavior of the least and the most risk averse agents in Φ⋆ is
simple and intuitive. The actions of the least risk averse agent, Agent 1, are consistent
with CRRA0 (risk neutrality), and the actions of the most risk averse agent, Agent 0,
are consistent with CRRA2. By contrast, for any a ∈ (0, 1) and y ∈ Y , the actions
of Agent a are consistent with CRRAρa(y) for some ρa (y) ∈ (0, 2); the dependency
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of ρa (y) on y makes the representation of the preferences of these agents more cum-
bersome, and in particular, as we show in Appendix A, they do not have an expected
utility representation. In the next section, we demonstrate numerically that a simple
distribution of preferences, in which all agents have constant relative risk aversion pref-
erences (which are in particular, vNM preferences), and the relative risk coefficient is
uniformly distributed between zero (risk neutrality) and two (harmonic utility) achieves
99.85% of the optimal long-run growth rate.
4 Numeric Analysis
In this section, we use a Monte Carlo simulation to evaluate which percentage of the
theoretically optimal growth rate is induced by various simple distributions of utilities.
Distributions of utilities We compare 15 distributions of utilities:
1. Five homogeneous populations in which all agents have the same utility:
(a) Extreme risk loving - All agents always choose the risky alternative (as long
as Pr [y > µ] ̸= 0).
(b) Extreme risk aversion - All agents always choose the safe alternative (as long
as Pr [y < µ] ̸= 0).
(c) Risk neutrality (CRRA0) - All agents evaluate risky choices by their arith-
metic mean.
(d) Logarithmic utility ( CRRA1) - All agents evaluate risky choices by their
geometric mean.
(e) Harmonic utility (CRRA2) - All agents evaluate risky choices by their har-
monic mean.
2. Two classes of heterogeneous populations with monotone distributions. In each
class, each agent is endowed with a value β ∈ [0, 1] (each class includes 5 distri-
butions of β as detailed below). All classes have the property characterized by
Corollary 1, namely that the most and least risk averse agents (corresponding to
β = 1 and β = 0, respectively) evaluate a risky alternative y as having a certainty
equivalent value of the harmonic mean and arithmetic mean of y, respectively.
3. The behavior of the β-agent in each class is as follows:
(a) Constant relative risk aversion: All agents have CRRA2β preferences where
β’s distribution is detailed below.
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(a) Unimodal distribution: Beta (2, 2)




(b) Bimodal distribution: Beta (0, 5, 0.5)




(c) Positively skewed dist.: Beta (2, 4)




(d) Negatively skewed dist.: Beta (4, 2).
Figure 1: Probability Density Function (PDF) of Beta (α, β).
(b) Weighted average of means: All agents evaluate risky alternatives as a
weighted average of their harmonic mean and arithmetic means: CEβ (y) =
β · HM (y) + (1 − β) · E [y],3 where β’s distribution is detailed below.
4. We use five beta distributions for β ∈ [0, 1] for the two classes (as demonstrated
in Figure 1):
(a) Uniform distribution: β ∼ Beta (1, 1).
(b) Unimodal distribution: β ∼ Beta (2, 2).
(c) Bimodal distribution: β ∼ Beta (0, 5, 0.5).
(d) Positively skewed distribution: β ∼ Beta (2, 4).
(e) Negatively skewed distribution: β ∼ Beta (4, 2).
Description of the simulation The simulation evaluates the performance of each
distribution of utilities over 10.7M choices between a safe option µ and a binary risky
3Note that for any β ̸= 0, 1, this preference cannot be represented using expected utility. Consider




, and the two degenerate lotteries M = 4 − β and N = 4.
Then, • CEβ (L) = CEβ (M) = 4 − β.
• CEβ (1/2L + 1/2N) = 4 −
4β
7




64 − 16β + β2 − β3
)
and hence Agent β is indifferent between L and M but is not between 1/2L + 1/2N and 1/2M + 1/2N ,
in violation of the Independence Axiom of vNM, and in particular, the preference of Agent β cannot
be represented using expected utility.
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option y yielding either a low realization ℓ or a high realization h. We run the following
scenario for the distribution of risky lottery in each generation (The alternatives in
different generations are independent of each other):
• In each generation, the two alternatives are defined by three independent uniform
random numbers p, q, r ∈ [0, 1], where:4
– p is the probability of the risky alternative yielding its high realization h.
p = Pr [y = h]
– q is the ratio between the low realization and the safe alternative: q = ℓ/µ.
– r is the ratio between safe alternative and the high realization: r = µ/h.
Without loss of generality, we normalize the value of the safe alternative to be µ = 1.
In each simulation run we calculate the theoretically optimal growth rate grα⋆ (y, µ),
and then evaluate the percentage of this optimal growth rate achieved by each of the 15
distributions of utilities. Finally, we calculate the geometric mean of this percentage for
each distribution over all the simulation runs, which evaluates the relative performance
of each distribution (in terms of its long-run growth rate) in a setup in which the risky
& safe alternatives change from one generation to another.
Results The results are summarized in Table 1. The optimal growth rate in our
setup is 1.428 (which is calculated as the geometric mean of the growth rates achieved
in each generation). We evaluate the performance of each distribution of preferences
according to the relative growth rate loss, i.e., according to the percentage of the optimal
growth rate that is lost with this distribution of preferences. The optimal homogeneous
population in which all agents have logarithmic utility looses 2.1% of the optimal growth
rate. Heterogeneous CRRA populations reduce this loss substantially to less than 1%
(which is better than what can be achieved by mixed-average populations). Moreover,
heterogeneous CRRA populations in which β is distributed uniformly (or a according
to a unimodal distribution) achieve an additional reduction of this loss into only 0.15%.
Robustness check In order to check the robustness of our results, we tested the
following other parameter distributions (30 additional distributions in total):
• Taking the probability, Pr [y = h], and the two ratios, GM(y)/µ and µ/E[y], to be
three i.i.d. uniformly distributed random numbers in [0, 1].
4Equivalently, p, ℓ, h are independent given µ and sampled as follows: p ∈U [0, 1], ℓ ∈U [0, µ], and
h ∈ [µ, ∞) with the inverse-uniform distribution with parameters ⟨0, 1⟩ (F (x) = 1−µ/x ; f (x) = µ/x2).
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Table 1: Summary of results of simulation runs (10.7M generations).








E [α] GM (grα (y, µ)) 1 −
GM(grα(y,µ))
GM(grα⋆ (y,µ))
Optimal (Corollary 1) 0.500 1.425 0.00%
Homogeneous
populations
Always risky 1.0 0.995 30.2%
Always safe 0.0 1.000 29.8%










Uniform 0.500 1.423 0.14%
Unimodal 0.500 1.423 0.15%
Bimodal 0.0500 1.421 0.29%
Positively skewed 0.551 1.412 0.93%




Uniform 0.530 1.405 1.4%
Unimodal 0.535 1.398 1.9%
Bimodal 0.524 1.410 1.0%
Positively skewed 0.577 1.376 3.5%
Negatively skewed 0.491 1.405 1.4%











for k = 2, . . . , 5 and i = 1, . . . , k.
For all these distributions, we see similar qualitative results in which the heterogeneous
CRRA populations outperform the other populations and the optimal growth rate is
approximated by a heterogeneous CRRA population with a simple distribution of the
relative risk parameter (uniform and unimodal).
5 Discussion
In what follows we discuss various aspects of our model and their implications.
Empirical predictions Our model suggests that natural selection had endowed the
population with (1) risk-averse preferences and (2) heterogeneity in the level of risk
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aversion s.t. the agents’ certainty equivalent values for a given lottery are distributed
between the lottery’s harmonic mean and its expectation, and that (3) the preference
distribution can be approximated by constant relative risk aversion utilities with relative
risk aversion between zero and two. Our model deals with lotteries with respect to
the number of offspring (fitness), but it is plausible that people apply these endowed
risk attitudes when dealing with lotteries over money, which is what typically tested
in the empirical literature.5 Chiappori & Paiella (2011) rely on large panel data to
show that the elasticity of the risky asset share to wealth is small and statistically
insignificant, which supports our first prediction of people having constant relative risk
aversion utilities. Halek & Eisenhauer (2001) relies on life insurance data to estimate
the distribution of the levels of relative risk aversion in the population. Their data
suggests that there is substantial heterogeneity in the levels of relative risk aversion
in the population, and that about 80% of the population have levels of relative risk
aversion between zero and two (Halek & Eisenhauer, 2001, Figure 1).
Risk neutrality with respect to idiosyncratic risk: We implicitly assume that
agents are risk neutral with respect to idiosyncratic risk over the number of offspring.
This assumption is plausible, as it is well-known that risk neutrality with respect to
idiosyncratic risk maximizes the growth rate (see, e.g., Robson, 1996). In particular, if
there are multiple safe alternatives (with idiosyncratic risk) it is optimal for all agents
to choose the alternative with the highest expectation.
Multiple risky alternatives: If there are multiple sources of risky alternatives, each
with its own shared risk (e.g., multiple foraging techniques, where agents using the
same foraging technique have correlated risk), then we implicitly assume that agents
use some decision rule to choose between the different risky sources, and the single
risky alternative in our model represents a combination of these sources. For example,
if there are several identically distributed risky alternatives y1, .., yn, then it is not hard
to show that it is optimal for the agents to divide equally among these alternatives, and
this will be modeled by the single risky alternative y = y
1+...+yn
n
. We do not analyze the
general question of how to optimally diversify risk among different sources of correlated
risk.
5A non-linear relationship between consumption and fitness in our evolutionary past might shift the
optimal levels of risk aversion with respect to money. Specifically, if the expected number of offspring
is a concave function of consumption, then the support of the optimal distribution of relative risk
aversion with respect to consumption will be a shift to the right of the [0, 2] interval.
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Difficulties with applying the existing representations in our setup: In what
follows we briefly discuss why it is difficult to apply the three existing representations in
our setup, which highlights the advantage of our new representation. The assumption
that agents cannot hedge their own personal risk (but, rather each agent must make a
binary choice between y and µ) does not allow the population to achieve the optimal
growth rate by either the first representation (all agents having logarithmic utility, as
discussed after Fact 1) or the third representation (each agent applies bet hedging).
The assumption that an agent cannot condition her play on the aggregate behavior,
prevents the population from achieving the optimal growth rate by relying on the sec-
ond representation (agents maximizing expected relative fitness, where the calculation
of relative fitness crucially depends on the aggregate behavior). We think that both
assumptions have been plausible in our evolutionary past: in many cases risky alterna-
tives (such as, foraging technique) require long training and specialization that makes
it difficult for an agent to hedge risk by dividing her time between several different
alternatives. Moreover, it seems plausible that agents in prehistoric times would not
know the aggregate behavior in the population.
Random expected utility Out interpretation of the optimal distribution of pref-
erences in the population is heterogeneity in the population, namely some agents are
more risk averse than others. We note that the optimal distribution can also be imple-
mented by random expected utility (see, e.g., Gul & Pesendorfer, 2006), namely that
each agent is endowed with the optimal distribution of preferences, and in each decision
problem each agent randomly applies one of these preferences.
6 Conclusion
The key result that aggregate risk yields a lower growth rate than idiosyncratic risk has
been applied in the existing literature to derive three representations for the optimal
risk preferences of agents: logarithmic utility, relative fitness, and bet hedging. We
argue that all of these representations are difficult to implement in a plausible setup in
which each agent faces a binary choice between a risky alternative and a safe alternative,
and agents do not know the aggregate choices in the population. We present a new
representation, according to which nature induces the agents with a distribution of
preferences to choose between a risky alternative and a safe alternative.
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We show that in any any distribution of preferences which induces the maximal
long-run growth rate, the most risk averse agent is indifferent between obtaining a
risky lottery and obtaining its harmonic mean for sure, while the least risk averse agent
is risk neutral, that is, indifferent between obtaining a risky lottery and obtaining its
arithmetic mean for sure. Moreover, we show numerically that a nearly-optimal growth
rate is induced by a population of expected utility maximizers with constant relative
risk aversion preferences, in which the risk coefficient is distributed between zero and
two according to a simple distribution (uniform or unimodal).
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A Optimal Monotone Distribution Does Not Have
an Expected Utility Representation
Consider the following five lotteries



























Then, the median agent prefers L over M and prefers Y = 1/2M + 1/2N over
X = 1/2L + 1/2N . But this is a violation of the Independence Axiom of vNM and in
particular, the preference of the median agent cannot be represented using expected
utility.6
• Her certainty equivalent value for M is ≈ 2.54, hence she prefers L over M .
• Her certainty equivalent value for X is ≈ 6.04, hence she prefers the safe option 6.1
over X.
• Her certainty equivalent value for Y is ≈ 6.19, hence she prefers Y over the safe
option 6.1, and Y over X.
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